Identifying Different Narratives in Niger
In a pattern that has been repeated a half dozen times in the Sahel over the past few years, soldiers from the presidential guard detained Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26th, 2023. Later that day, a group of military officers from various branches announced they had overthrown the democratically elected civilian government, and established the so-called National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CSNP) to govern the country.
As stated, this is not unprecedented — and is becoming more of a norm — in former French colonies in the Sahel (excepting Sudan which was a British colony), with military juntas ruling from Guinea in the west to Sudan in the east. This most recent coup continues the trend of deteriorating governance across the Sahel and the wider world. But this coup is unique both because of Niger’s nascent democracy, and the responses it has provoked domestically and internationally.
Another Coup d’etat
Niger in its recent history has been ruled by an assortment of dictators and military juntas, not achieving its first peaceful and democratic transfer of power until now-ousted President Bazoum won the presidency in 2020 and 2021 (run-off elections). After his election, President Bazoum declared his intention to work with Western partners to oust Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and other insurgents plaguing the country. Additionally, he vowed to cut out corruption and utilize the help of Western partners and modern economic policies to improve Niger’s economy.
The leaders of the coup in Niger ostensibly stated that their usurpation “…follows the continuous deterioration of the security situation, [and ] the bad social and economic management [of President Bazoum].” However, President Bazoum and Niger have fared better than other junta-controlled Sahel states like Mali and Burkina Faso. While Niger did see increasing political and insurgent violence from 2019 to 2021 under former President Issoufou, it peaked at the time of the transfer of power to President Bazoum. Since then, while Niger still has a high number of violent events, they have far fewer compared to their junta neighbors, and fatalities from violent events have steadily declined.
Economically, Niger under President Bazoum has begun to improve. While the country is still one of the world’s poorest and still heavily reliant on foreign aid, according to the World Bank, real GDP growth is projected to reach 6.9% in 2023 and possibly climb to 12.5% in 2024. These are largely due to donor support, increased oil production, the end of the pandemic, and economic reforms which have already increased GDP per capita to more than 15% of what it was in 2021.
While materially the reasons stated for the coup do not seem to pan out, there are more underlying problems in Niger. Corruption afflicts the underdeveloped nation, and anti-French sentiment from Niger’s neighbors — especially among their large youth populations — is driving much of the vocal anger towards Bazoum’s administration. Although economic forecasts put Niger on the path to growth, around half the population still lives in extreme poverty. President Bazoum fully embraced Western security partners: inviting the French army in after it was booted from Mali, hosting a major US drone base, and working closely with Western development partners. While casualties from battles with insurgents may be comparatively low for the region (as stated before, Bazoum’s counter-insurgency strategy appears to be working), statistics do not change the fact that soldiers on the ground see their comrades falling to insurgents and data cannot mollify their negative feelings towards civilian leaders. Additionally, Bazoum was in the process of reshuffling the leadership of the security forces when the coup took place. It was rumored he planned to sack the now coup leader and head of the presidential guard General Abdourahamane Tchiani. In violence-prone Sahel states, the security forces receive increased aggrandizement, being propped up as the primary means of defeating insurgents, so discontent among the rank and file can be disastrous for any government. Finally, the coup leaders in Niger saw the power attained by those in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, and thus wanted to selfishly maximize their own power potential. It seems that Bazoum—a reformer but not necessarily a stalwart democrat — was caught in a bad place at a bad time while the coup leaders — opportunists capitalizing on instability and discontent — have been able to channel popular anger to gain power.
Immediately the coup was met with international and domestic condemnation. Pro-Bazoum rallies spontaneously began in the capital Niamey on July 26th when the coup began. Condemnation poured in from the United States, United Nations, and European Union. The Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, has also strongly condemned the coup. After a meeting on July 30th, the regional bloc announced it had given the junta in Niger one week to restore civilian rule or else it would “take all measures necessary to restore constitutional order in the Republic of Niger,” including the use of force. ECOWAS has also issued crippling sanctions on Niger, stopping all commercial and financial flows between the bloc and the junta.
The tough words and actions of ECOWAS have not yet deterred the military junta, and the coup leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso have declared that any ECOWAS attack against Niger would be considered an attack against them as well. The Russian mercenary Wagner Group — which is active in Mali, Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic — has also offered to support the junta to “restore order.” These actions and statements issued by the pro-Bazoum and pro-junta camps have raised concerns over major conflict and violence in a region already suffering from terrorist insurgency, exposing a wider geopolitical competition occurring on the continent.
Duelling Narratives
On August 3rd, protestors in support of the coup took to the streets, setting fire to the headquarters of President Bazoum’s political party. Among the orange, green, and white of the Nigerien flag, the protestors also carried the blue, red, and white of the Russian flag. This sort of demonstration is not uncommon across other Sahel states. It seems that the anti-Western sentiments of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and now Niger, are accompanied by pro-Russian and pro-Putin sentiments.
The logic of these protestors, while flawed, is understandable. Niger and other West African states underwent decades of oppressive and violent colonial domination by the French, British, and Portuguese, and then even after independence continued (and often continue) to suffer from neocolonial policies or institutions. The failure of French “security forces” to provide security has led to justifiable anger by locals who must live with the externalities of French failure. Important also is the young age of the demonstrators, many of whom struggle to find jobs in Niger’s underdeveloped economy. Their protests express frustration with what they see as an entrenched elite propped up by the West. Many youths do not see Bazoum as the great reformer he is hailed as in the West. They see him — and by extension democracy — as corrupt and unable to deliver for their needs. Naturally, they see Russia as the enemy of their enemy as a better partner for development and security.
But Russia and the juntas it supports have no real interest in increasing the human development of people in West Africa or across the continent. Russia is motivated by its interests, not its humanitarianism, attempting to normalize authoritarianism in Africa and the wider world to undermine democracies tied to the European Union and the United States. Russian actors — most recently through the leader of the Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin — have spread disinformation to sway elections, co-opted pan-Africanist movements, and inflamed political divisions. The Wagner Group, funded by the Russian government, has also committed alleged crimes against humanity in Libya, the Central African Republic, and now Mali. While Western nations may have and still do treat African nations poorly, turning to Russia seems to be less than Africans deserve.
The Solution (or at least part of it)
While Russia has been shown to be calculated rather than compassionate, Western engagement in Africa has been driven by security maximization, short-sighted protection of Western interests, and the misguided advice of so-called “experts.”
In the past, Western nations have lectured and assisted African governments with elections, governance, and rights protection, but have also actively engaged and supported dictators and military juntas. They focus on electoralism, opposition politics, and candidate training while putting less emphasis on material support (although development agencies like USAID have been making strides in this area). As it is often said, “You cannot eat democracy!” and a democracy that cannot functionally deliver the goods and services its people require will fall. Western democracies must also show up diplomatically for Africa, bringing the fervor they have for the conflict in Ukraine to other conflicts on the continent. Finally, they must fully support Africa on the international stage, with a seat at the table in and reform of multinational development institutions and the United Nations Security Council. These small steps are ones that the West can take to transform their relationship with African allies and partners, turning it from parental to mutual.
On the continent, Africans can rely more on regional institutions like the African Union and ECOWAS. These institutions have proved in the past that they can deal with conflict and violence through peace enforcement missions and diplomatic pressure when provided with the appropriate resources. They also can help break down barriers to intra-African trade, strengthen institutions across nations, and promote good governance practices through soft power, economic incentives, and military action when necessary. Just as the European Union has succeeded in increasing the state capacity of post-Soviet states, African regional and continental institutions could help governments deliver material needs to their citizens while simultaneously promoting good governance practices. Regional unions, like ECOWAS, must also enact policies that seek to prevent coups from happening in the first place and avoid losing legitimacy when responding to coups. If Western powers increase their engagement with these regional entities, they could better support peace and security on the African continent.
There is no simple fix to the coup belt emerging across the Sahel. A myriad of factors that went unaddressed for years have culminated in this recent crisis of governance. What states and citizens can do now is commit themselves to addressing governance, security, and economic issues so that the situation in the next few years does not continue to worsen. Democracy can flourish, but it takes time, dedication, and development.
This article is just my original reactions, as well as lots of information and opinions of people cited throughout the article and below. I will be writing more about topics like development and governance in Africa in the future. I especially want to — as a person in the West — express to a Western audience how engagement with Africa and the wider global south can be improved. Thank you as always for reading, and I appreciate any and all feedback.